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For decades, Maryland's employment discrimination law' was
an empty promise with no meaningful enforcement scheme. Maryland
resided in the ranks of a handful of states that offered employees no
private right of action in state court to enforce the prohibition against
workplace discrimination. Instead, employees were limited to filing an
administrative complaint with the Maryland Commission on Human
Relations (MCHR). The MCHR could investigate and attempt to
resolve the claim through conciliation. The potential recovery,
however, was limited to three years of backpay, without the possibility
of compensatory or punitive damages or attorneys' fees. This
provided no relief to employees who experienced on-the-job
harassment, for which the damages are typically emotional in nature. If
the conciliation or mediation efforts at the administrative level failed,
neither the MCHR nor the employee could file an action in state circuit
court. Instead, employees were forced to pursue a case in federal court
using only the federal law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
Employees had no way to vindicate the remedial and deterrent
purposes of Maryland's employment discrimination law, and
employers did not take it seriously.
In 2007, after a fifteen-year struggle by employee advocates
and the MCHR, the Maryland General Assembly passed a private
right of action to allow employees to file suit in state circuit court to
vindicate their right to be free from workplace discrimination.3 The
express purpose of the law was to open the doors to the local
courthouse. The new private right of action ensures access to the
Copyright © 2009 by Deborah Thompson Eisenberg.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Maryland's antidiscrimination code was formerly known as "Article 49B" and was
found at MD. CODE ANN., art. 49B, § 16 (2003). The Maryland General Assembly has repealed
Article 49B and recodified the statute without substantive changes. See H.B. 51, 2009 Leg.,
426th Sess. (Md. 2009). H.B. 51 will add a new title to the State Government Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland, to be designated and known as "Title 20. Human Relations."
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
3. H.B. 1034, 2006 Leg., 42 1st Sess. (Md. 2006).
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circuit court for employment discrimination claims throughout all
counties in Maryland.
During the hearings on the private right of action bill, known as
the Civil Rights Preservation Act of 2006, the legislature heard
compelling testimony about how people who experienced workplace
discrimination in the far reaches of Maryland-in Western or Southern
Maryland or on the Eastern Shore-had to travel six hours to find a
lawyer in the Baltimore-Washington area to prosecute a Title VII
claim in federal court. Given the logistical hurdles of pursuing a case
so far from home, many individuals who lived outside of the
Baltimore-Washington corridor simply did nothing to seek redress for
workplace discrimination.
As of October 1, 2007, Maryland's anti-discrimination promise
finally has "teeth" in the form of a private right of action in state court.
In introducing the bill to committee, Delegate Sandy Rosenberg, the
bill's sponsor, described the importance of providing discrimination
victims their day in court before a jury of their peers:
Our constituents who are discriminated against deserve
their day in state court, and [this bill] would provide
that remedy to them.. . Victims of employ[ment]
discrimination would have access to a jury trial in state
court. The right to a trial by one's peers is an essential
safeguard of liberty because it ensures independence in
the judicial process. In their pursuit of justice, victims
of discrimination are, in many cases, among the
weakest members of our society and are particularly in
need of a jury of their own peers, which identifies with
the average citizen.4
Part II of this essay provides a brief overview of the mechanics
of the new private right of action. Part III describes how the new
remedy provides choices and meaningful relief to people who
experience workplace discrimination. Part IV reflects my comments at
the Symposium Having it Our Way: Women in Maryland's Workplace
Circa 2027. The essay concludes by encouraging employee advocates
to use the promising opportunity of a new remedy with no developed
case law in a thoughtful, responsible manner.
4. Civil Rights Preservation Act of 2006: Testimony on H.B. 1034 Before the Health
and Government Operations Comm., 2006 Leg., 42 1st Sess. (Md. 2006) (testimony of Del.
Samuel I. Rosenberg) (on file with author).
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE NEW MARYLAND PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The remedies provided by the Maryland employment
discrimination law mirror those provided under Title VII. Prior to
filing an action in court, complainants must first file an administrative
charge or complaint with the MCHR, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or a local human relations
commission. 5 After the investigatory stage, the complainant has
several options.
First, in those cases in which the MCHR finds that the
employer engaged in unlawful conduct, and the employer refuses to
remedy and eliminate the discrimination, 6 the MCHR may file an
action in circuit court,7 similar to the EEOC's power under Title VII.
The potential of agency enforcement is critical in addressing systemic
discrimination and providing representation for those who may not be
able to retain private counsel. In addition to the right of the MCHR to
file suit in the circuit court on the claimant's or the agency's behalf,
Maryland law now provides a "small claims" avenue of relief.8 If the
administrative law judge (ALJ) finds that the employer engaged in a
discriminatory act, the AU may issue a cease and desist order to
enjoin the employer from engaging in future discriminatory acts; 9
order appropriate affirmative relief, including reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without backpay; award compensatory
damages (with the same cap levels as in Title V1I);" I or order any other
equitable relief the AU deems appropriate.'
2
Second, 180 days after filing a charge with the agency, the
complainant may file suit in court, even if the MCHR has not yet
issued a finding.' 3 Employees seeking compensatory or punitive
damages may demand a trial by jury.'4 The court may award
compensatory damages, 15 back pay and interest on back pay,
16
5. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T, § 20-1013(a)(1) (West 2009).
6. Id. § 20-1007(b)(I)-(2).
7. Id. § 20-1007(a).
8. See id.§ 20-1007(a)(l)-(2) (allowing complainants for whom the MCHR has made a
finding of discrimination the option of trying their cases in front of the Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings).
9. Id. § 20-1009(a)(2).
10. Id. § 20-1009(b)(l)(ii).
II. Id. § 20-1009(b)(1)(iii), § 20-1009(b)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 2008).
12. Id. § 20-1009(b)(l)(iv)
13. Id. § 20-1013(a)(i)-(2).
14. Id. § 20-1013(f).
15. Id. § 20-1009(b)(1)(iii).
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punitive damages,' 7 and "[a]ny other equitable relief the complainant
is entitled to recover under any other provision of law."' 8 In addition,
the court "may award the prevailin party reasonable attorney's fees,
expert witness fees, and costs. '  The same damages caps for
compensatory and punitive damages that exist under Title VII apply
under Maryland's law: $50,000 for employers who employ between 15
and 100 employees; $100,000 for employers who employ between 101
and 200 employees; $200,000 for employers who employ between 201
and 500 employees; and $300,000 for employers who employ 501 or
more employees.
20
Ill. IMPORTANCE OF MARYLAND'S NEW PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Even though the new Maryland private right of action is
essentially a Title VII copycat, the new statute matters for several
reasons. First, the protected classes under Maryland law are broader
than those under Title VII. Second, employees now have meaningful
choices about which remedies to pursue. Finally, a prime opportunity
exists to build a body of case law that will benefit employees in a
positive way.
A. Maryland Protects Broader Classes
Maryland's antidiscrimination law protects broader classes
than Title VII. In addition to the categories protected under federal
law-race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, and disability2 1-
Maryland law also prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital
status, sexual orientation, genetic information, and "refusal to submit
to a genetic test or make available the results of a genetic test. ,22 A
separate section also prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy. 2 3
The definition of "disability" under Maryland law is both
broader and narrower than the federal Americans with Disabilities Act
16. Id. § 20-1009(b)(2)(i).
17. Id. § 20-1013(e). Punitive damages may not be awarded against government entities
or political subdivisions. Id. § 20-1013(e)(1).
18. Id. § 20-1009(b)(2)(ii).
19. Id. § 20-1015.
20. Id. § 20-1009(b)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 2008).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
22. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 20-606 (West 2009).
23. Id. § 20-608.
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(ADA). The ADA focuses on whether the disability affects a "major
life activity.' 24 Under Maryland law, "disability" means:
[A]ny physical disability, infirmity, malformation or
disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth
defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall
include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis,
amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or
visual impairment, deafness or hearing impairment,
muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on
a seeing eye dog, wheelchair, or other remedial
appliance or device; and any mental impairment or
deficiency as, but not limited to, retardation or such
other which may have necessitated remedial or special
education and related services.
25
Prior to the passage of the private right of action in Maryland,
these broader rights to be free from discrimination based on disability,
sexual orientation, marital status, and genetic information were
unenforceable. Now, these protections have true meaning for
Maryland workers.
B. Employees Have Meaningful Choices about Remedies
Second, the new remedy is important because employees now
have meaningful choices about whether to pursue local, state, or
federal remedies, and whether to file suit in federal or state court.
Plaintiffs may file in federal court and assert both state and federal
claims, or assert only the state law claim and proceed in state circuit
court.26 It is common wisdom among Maryland practitioners that
federal courts are more likely to grant summary judgment and preclude
plaintiffs from having their day in court.27 In Maryland circuit court,
plaintiffs are more likely to proceed to a jury trial. In addition, by
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)(1990).
25. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-601(b) (West 2009).
26. Plaintiffs may, of course, file Title VI1 claims in state court, but employers are likely
to immediately remove the case to federal court ifa federal claim is asserted.
27. According to federal judiciary statistics, only 4.6 percent of employment civil rights
cases reach trial. See Federal Judicial Case Load Statistics, tbl.C-4,
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2007/contents.html (last visted Mar. 4, 2009). U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS--CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT AND ACTION TRAKEN, DURING THE
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2007,
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2007/tables/C04Mar07.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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ensuring access to the local courthouse, employees in the far reaches
of the state, not just those who work close to a federal courthouse, may
seek redress for discrimination.
The issue of forum selection raises many strategic questions
from a practitioner's perspective. For example, several counties in
Maryland-Prince George's, Montgomery, and Howard Counties-
have local ordinances that protect broader classes of individuals. In
addition to the classes protected by Maryland law, the county
ordinances prohibit discrimination based on familial status,2 8 family
responsibilities,29 occupation,3 ° political opinion,3' and personal
appearance 32 not related to cleanliness or proscribed attire. 33 In
addition, the local laws apply to nearly all employers. Unlike Title VII
and Maryland law, which cover employers who employ more than
fifteen employees, 34  the laws in Prince George's and Montgomery
Counties apply to employers who employ one or more individuals, and
Howard County's law applies to employers with at least five
employees.
35
Long before the new statewide remedy, the Maryland General
Assembly passed authorizing legislation that permits claims under the
local ordinances in Howard, Montgomery, and Prince George's
Counties to be filed in circuit court. The local laws of Howard,
Montgomery, and Prince George's Counties are attractive to plaintiffs
because they do not cap compensatory and punitive damages. Under
the local ordinances, the court may award "damages, injunctive relief,
or other civil relief,, 36 as well as "reasonable attorney's fees, expert
28. See, e.g., Howard County Code § 12.208(I)(a) (1977); Prince George's County Code
§ 2-186(a)(7.1 ) (1999).
29. See, e.g., Montgomery County Code § 27-19(a) (1997).
30. See, e.g., Howard County Code § 12.208(i)(a); Prince George's County Code § 2-
186(a)(3).
31. See, e.g., Howard County Code § 12.208(I)(a); Prince George's County Code § 2-
186(a)(3).
32. See, e.g., Howard County Code § 12.208(I)(a); Prince George's County Code § 2-
186(a)(3).
33. See, e.g., Prince George's County Code § 2-186(a)(14).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-601(d) (West
2009).
35. Prince George's County Code § 2-186(a)(5); Howard County Code § 12.208(I)(d).
36. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-1202(b) (West 2009).
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witness fees, and costs." 37 The new statewide remedy clarifies that it
does not affect or limit these broader local remedies.
38
IV. THE NEED TO WRITE RESPONSIBLY ON MARYLAND'S "CLEAN
SLATE"
In addition to providing plaintiffs with meaningful choices of
remedies and local access to justice, the new Maryland private right of
action remedy is significant on a broader level for us today, as we
discuss a blueprint for future employment law for women in this state.
It matters because Maryland has a "clean slate." We have a remedial
law that holds tremendous potential, without any case law developed
under it. We have a very unique opportunity and special responsibility
to build that law in a positive, smart way for employees in the state.
Employee advocates, civil rights groups, legal scholars, and law
students who are interested in employment law all need to work in a
coordinated and intelligent way to ensure the sound development of
this new remedy.
How do we do that? First, we need to figure out how we want
our new law to develop. We need to examine how Title VII law has
developed in the federal courts, and determine where federal standards
have eviscerated the remedial effect of the law. We need to study how
other states have developed standards under their own anti-
discrimination laws. We also need to work to develop a solid body of
case law that fosters the remedial purposes of the statute in our
appellate courts.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has shown that it is willing to
forge its own path and not simply defer to deficient standards adopted
by federal courts. A compelling example of the judicial independence
of the Maryland Court of Appeals is the recent decision in Haas v.
Lockheed Martin Corporation.39 In this case, the court considered
when the statute of limitations began for a discriminatory discharge
claim filed pursuant to the Montgomery County anti-discrimination
code.40 Previously, the United States Supreme Court held that the
statute of limitations for a discriminatory discharge claim under Title
VII begins on the date the employee received notice of an impending
37. Id. § 20-1202(d).
38. Id. § 20-1002. Claimants who wish to proceed under one of the county laws must
study these local remedial schemes carefully and ensure that they satisfy all filing deadlines
and procedures.
39. 914 A.2d 735 (Md. 2007).
40. Id. at 737.
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adverse action, not the actual date of the termination of employment.4'
In Haas, however, the Maryland Court of Appeals departed from
federal precedent and held that the statute of limitations begins on the
date of actual discharge.
42
In Haas, the court emphasized that federal court opinions under
Title VII or comparable federal civil rights statutes may be "relevant
authorities," but "do not bind" Maryland courts.43 The majority made
this point in a particularly potent and eloquent way in a footnote.44
After a long list of citations to cases in which the Maryland Court of
Appeals diverged from Supreme Court pronouncements regarding
"federal dopplegangers," the court emphatically concluded, "Put in a
more homespun idiom, and paraphrasing a frequent motherly
admonition, 'Just because [Georgia] ran off a cliff doesn't mean
[Maryland] has to follow suit.' ' 4
5
As we put the writing on our new remedy, we must ensure that
Maryland does not simply jump off the same cliff that federal courts
have. We need to be ever vigilant that the judicial standards we work
to develop truly effectuate the remedial purposes of the law.
The first step in the sound development of Maryland case law
is to make sure that we are taking only the best test cases up to the
appellate level. We must work with the plaintiffs' bar to encourage
them not to file weak cases. The new remedy may tempt attorneys who
do not have any background or experience with employment litigation
to bring their first discrimination case. We need to reach out those
attorneys, educate them about this area of the law, and provide
litigation support where we can. We need to convince the plaintiffs'
bar not to appeal weaker cases that may make bad law. We need to
monitor the cases that make their way to the higher courts and provide
strong amicus curiae support where we can. In addition, we can help
practitioners with the first battleground they will face at trial:
developing solid jury instructions. Employee advocates will face a real
battle to convince trial judges not to simply adopt federal standards,
but to draft instructions appropriately tailored to Maryland's law.
41. Ricks v. Del. State College, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980); see also Chardon v.
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam) (discussing Ricks holding).
42. In an ironic twist, the only two women on the Maryland Court of Appeals dissented
in Haas, stating they would follow the federal standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Ricks
and Chardon. Haas, 914 A.2d at 754 (Battaglia & Raker, J.J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 742 (majority opinion).
44. Id. at 743 n. 10.
45. Id. (alterations in original).
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There is another danger that may inhibit the development of
our new state remedy: mandatory arbitration clauses. The management
bar has already sounded alarm bells to employers that the "the playing
field for litigating employment discrimination cases in the State of
Maryland" has been "drastically altered" with the availability of a
private right of action.46 Consequently, more employers will force
employees to sign mandatory arbitration clauses or jury trial waivers
as conditions of employment. 4 These documents are typically
contracts of adhesion-boilerplate employment applications, employee
handbooks, and other documents-that employees must sign, or else
get fired. Most employees either do not understand or are not aware of
the devastating effect these clauses may have on the vindication of
their civil rights should they experience unlawful discrimination on the
job. One scholar has described such mandatory arbitration clauses as
modem-day "yellow dog contracts. 48
Aside from the potential impact that mandatory arbitration
clauses have on individual employees, however, mandatory arbitration
of civil rights cases harms the public's interest on a more profound
level. When an employee files a discrimination case in court, she is not
simply seeking an individual remedy. She is a private attorney general,
the legislature's "chosen instrument ... to vindicate 'a policy that [the
legislature] considered of the highest priority. ,, 49  In addition to
enforcing the law, she serves the broader remedial goal of educating
the public about the continued existence and detrimental consequences
of workplace discrimination. As the Supreme Court has stated,
[t]he disclosure through litigation of incidents or
practices that violate national policies respecting
nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important,
46. Carla Murphy, Neil Duke & Stacy Bekman Radz, Maryland Employers Confronted
with Additional Liability as a Result of the Newly Enacted Anti-Discrimination Measure, MD.
ST. B. ASS'N, LAB. & EMP. SEC. NEWSL. (MD. St. B. Ass'n, Baltimore, MD) Vol. XII, No. 4,
Winter 2007/08, at 15 (on file with author).
47. See id at 16 (urging employers to consider mandatory mediation and arbitration
agreements and jury trial waivers as ways to limit exposure under state law).
48. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1996)
(arguing that "employers are using arbitration clauses as a new-found weapon to escape
burdensome employment regulations").
49. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978) (quoting Newman
v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)); see also McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (stating that "[t]he private litigant who seeks
redress for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the compensation objectives
of the ADEA [Age Discrimination in Employment Act].").
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for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of
noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of [the
anti-discrimination law's] operation or entrenched
resistance to its commands, either of which can be of
industry-wide significance. 50
Mandatory arbitration undermines the public's interest in
effectively exposing and deterring workplace discrimination. In effect,
by simply killing the "private attorney generals," employers are
undermining the important public policies of anti-discrimination
statutes and permitting the evil of workplace discrimination to flourish
undetected and undeterred.
Likewise, having discrimination cases decided in private arenas
rather than by our state court judges and juries will deprive the courts
of the opportunity to develop a body of case law interpreting the
statute. Over ten years ago, the EEOC issued a policy statement 5'
proclaiming that "agreements that mandate binding arbitration of
discrimination claims as a condition of employment are contrary to the
fundamental principles evinced in" civil rights laws preventing
discrimination in employment.
52
The EEOC has emphasized that the courts are charged with the
ultimate res onsibility for development and enforcement of the civil
rights laws. Mandatory arbitration undermines public enforcement of
the laws and prevents the development of anti-discrimination
jurisprudence through precedent.54 The arbitral process is private in
nature and allows for little, if any, public accountability. 55 The public
plays no role in the arbitrator's selection. 56 There is no opportunity for
review and correction of an arbitrator's erroneous application of the
law because "[j]udicial review of arbitral decisions is limited to the
narrowest of grounds. 57
50. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358-59.
51. Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition of Employment, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, (July 10, 1997),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html (last modified Sept. 14, 2004).
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 3-5.
54. See id. at 5.
55. See id. at 6.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitral awards may be vacated only for




We should work together to support federal legislation that
outlaws mandatory arbitration clauses imposed as a condition of
employment. 5s While working for the passage of such legislation,
practitioners should be cognizant of traditional contract defenses that
challenge and strike down arbitration clauses that are so one-sided in
favor of the employer that they are unconscionable.59
V. CONCLUSION
As we strategize about the future of the law for working
women in Maryland circa 2027, the passage of Maryland's new
private right of action teaches employee advocates some valuable
lessons and poses a special challenge. The fact that it required fifteen
years of advocacy to convince the Maryland legislature that employees
need a meaningful state remedy to enforce a right already on the books
teaches us that legislative and legal reforms will not happen quickly or
easily. We must continue to envision and prioritize needed workplace
reforms and develop innovative and multi-pronged approaches to
accomplish those reforms. In addition to legislative advocacy and
litigation, we must continue to educate employers and the public about
the harms of discrimination and the benefits of treating workers with
fairness, respect, and dignity. We must be creative, persistent, and
patient.
The new private right of action presents an extraordinary
opportunity to reeducate employers about the need to eliminate
58. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554 and H.R. 5129, 11 0th Cong. § 423
(2008) (banning mandatory arbitration of employment claims); Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007, S. 1782 and H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (banning mandatory arbitration in
consumer, employment, and franchise contracts).
59. The Federal Arbitration Act explicitly permits courts to refuse to enforce arbitration
clauses "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Courts have used contract principles to invalidate mandatory arbitration
clauses in the employment context in a variety of ways. Courts will invalidate arbitration
clauses if the plaintiff can show lack of contract formation. See Richard A. Bales, Contract
Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415 (2006) (reviewing various
court approaches to contract-formation challenges to the enforcement of employment
arbitration agreements). Courts will not permit any waivers of rights provided in the statute
(other than the jury trial right) and have invalidated limitations on damages awards, waivers of
attorneys' fees, or cost-shifting provisions. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983
F. Supp. 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding arbitration clause unenforceable as against public
policy to the extent it prevented employee from recovering legal fees to which he was entitled
under Title VII). With increasing frequency, courts are applying the doctrine of
unconscionability to invalidate arbitration clauses. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 761 (2004).
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discrimination in the workplace and a powerful tool to enforce
Maryland's anti-discrimination mandate. Employee advocates also
have a tremendous responsibility to develop case law that effectuates
the promise that all individuals may work in an environment free from
discrimination and harassment.
